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ABSTRACT
The notion ‘quality of life’ (QoL) suggests that welfare in animals encompasses more than just an
absence of suffering; it concerns the quality of an animal’s entire relationship with its environment, of how
it lives its life. Judgements of such quality are based on the integration of perceived details of how
animals behave over time in different contexts. The scientific status of such judgements has long been
ambiguous, but in recent decades has begun to be addressed by animal scientists. This paper starts with
a brief review of qualitative approaches to the study of animal behaviour, which tend to address
characteristics such as individuality, personality, and emotionality. The question then arises whether such
characteristics involve a subjective, experiential aspect, and identify animals as sentient beings. The
second half of this paper argues that taking the integrative nature of qualitative judgements seriously
enables a ‘whole animal’ perspective, through which it becomes possible to view behaviour as a dynamic,
expressive body language that provides a basis for assessing the quality of an animal’s experience (eg
contented, anxious). Judging this quality is a skill that requires knowledge of species-specific behaviour,
experience in observing and interacting with animals in different contexts, and a willingness to
communicate with animals as sentient beings. A substantial body of research indicates that this skill can
function reliably in a scientific context, and can be applied usefully as a practical welfare assessment tool.
Thus qualitative approaches to the study of animal behaviour should make an important contribution to
the growing interest in animal QoL.

Introduction
‘Quality of life’ (QoL) is a rich, complex notion that takes us beyond asking whether or how the
environment causes animals stress or suffering. It reflects a more positive, dynamic approach, which
inquires what animals like or prefer doing and what opportunities they have to fulfil these interests.
Welfare in this context encompasses more than just the absence of suffering, it concerns the quality of an
animal’s entire relationship with its environment, of how it lives its life. This paper is concerned with
whether and how we can address this quality, particularly in a scientific context. The term ‘quality’ has
many meanings, but basically it tends to refer to a general characteristic, an overall impression we have
of something. That impression is often evaluated in terms of how good we think something is, and so
‘quality’ also often means excellence. Our perception of quality tends not to depend on quantity — it is not
necessarily true that the more there is of something the better it gets. For example, if animals are

provided with greater levels of stimulation in their environment, leading to higher levels of activity, this
does not necessarily mean that their welfare improves. What matters to quality is how things are done,
their style; quality is a dynamic notion. Rather than the amount of attention we pay to companion animals,
for example, what matters is how we do this, the quality of that attention.
To address such quality is a judgement that involves the integration and weighing up of everything we
perceive and of the context in which we perceive it. Typically such judgements are made by human
observers and rely on our ability for complex perception and interpretation. But herein lies the catch for a
scientific approach to quality — in their primary reliance on human perception/interpretation, judgements
of quality are vulnerable to various forms of personal bias and are easily seen as just somebody’s
personal view. Given the risks of such subjective connotation, judgements of quality have, certainly within
the animal sciences, traditionally been kept outside the scientific domain. Yet discarding such judgements
from scientific methodology creates tension; we cannot stop ourselves from making qualitative
judgements in our daily lives, yet there are very few, if any, formal channels through which we can apply
these in our scientific work.
In the social sciences this situation has certainly changed over previous decades. Qualitative research
approaches are now part of most standard social science text books (eg Punch 2005), and fields of social
inquiry specifically aimed at the constructive scientific use of human qualitative judgements are growing
(eg Strauss & Corbin 1998). However, in the biological sciences the status of such judgements remains
very much unresolved. The central question addressed in this paper is therefore whether and how
qualitative judgements of how animals behave and live — ie their QoL — can be made and used in a
scientifically acceptable way. The paper will start with a brief review of the use of qualitative judgements
of behaviour in animal science, followed by a summary of our own research in this area and by some
suggestions for further research.
The use of qualitative judgements of behaviour in animal science
Joan Stevenson-Hinde was a pioneer in the scientific application of qualitative judgements of animal
behavior (Stevenson-Hinde & Zunz 1978). She used this approach to address the quality of ‘individuality’
in behaving organisms: “When observers spend hours recording behaviour, they end up not only with
behavioural data, but with clear impressions of individuals” (Stevenson-Hinde et al 1980, p 66;
Stevenson-Hinde 1983). Her main interest was in child development, but she also applied her experience
in this field to rhesus monkeys, whom she described for example as ‘confident’, ‘sociable’, or ‘excitable’
(Stevenson-Hinde et al 1980). The generation of such descriptors, she said, is a form of ‘subjective
assessment’ due to the active role of the human observer: “the observer is an active instrument, filtering,
cumulating, weighting, and integrating” (Stevenson-Hinde et al 1980, p 66). Further development of this
approach was taken up by Julie Feaver and colleagues, who applied the descriptors used by StevensonHinde to the study of domestic cats (Feaver et al 1986). In the view of these authors, these descriptors
capture the quality of an animal’s ‘overall pattern of behaviour’, which they interpret as its ‘behavioural
style’. They agree with Stevenson-Hinde that human observers play an active role in the perception of
these patterns, but they do not think that this sets qualitative assessments apart from conventional
ethogram-based recordings of behaviour as subjective. Conventional recordings, too, Feaver and
colleagues contend, inevitably involve judgements on the part of the observer (eg deciding precisely
when a behaviour starts or stops), and in this respect are as subjective as those involving observers’
judgements of behavioural style. Qualitative types of assessment differ from more conventional methods
only in that they involve observation of behaviour over a longer period of time. This difference, according
to Feaver and colleagues, is precisely where their potential value lies, “because the observer has played
a computationally powerful role in filtering, accumulating and integrating information” (Feaver et al 1986, p
1024).

The idea to judge the behavioural style of individual animals over a longer period of time has in recent
decades blossomed into a field of study concerned with animal temperament and personality (Gosling
2001). Measurement of these behavioural qualities takes place by means of rating scales that scientists
have developed for different species along the phylogenetic scale, ranging from fish (Brown et al 2005)
and snakes (Dutton & Andersson 2002) to hyenas (Gosling 1998), bears (Fagen & Fagen 1996) and
great apes (Weiss et al 2006). These scales are often applied and tested by animal caretakers and
owners, who, having observed the animals over long periods of time, tend to know them well. There is
plenty of evidence from this work that ratings of temperament and personality are reliable and useful, for
example in investigating breeding success in individual animals in zoos (Carlstead et al 1999), or rehoming success in kennelled dogs (Normando et al 2006). However, the scientific and moral implications
of ascribing qualities of ‘individuality’ and ‘personality’ to animals across the phylogenetic scale are
controversial (Midgley 1983; Sharpe 2005). The existence of individual differences in animals is
undisputed, but the concern is that attributing personality to animals may open the door to an
anthropomorphic, distorted view of them as semi-human creatures (Serpell 2003). And indeed, truly
regarding animals as individuals with personality would have a profound effect on how we view them.
Animals would no longer be merely ‘organisms’ or ‘complex survival systems’; they would become
somebody, personal beings with their own character, who can be our companions and to whom we give
names (Hearne 1986). For the general public, such qualities form the basis for empathy and shared
relationships, and are primary criteria for attributing animals with sentience. The public does not
distinguish clearly between personality and emotionality, but regards both qualities as expressions of the
sentience we share with animals in a ‘community of subjects’ (Arluke & Sanders 1996).
The question is whether the qualitative perception of animals as sentient beings provides an authentic,
legitimate perspective that could potentially receive scientific support, or whether it merely reflects a
muddled anthropomorphic projection of human values (Keeley 2004). It should be noted, first of all, that
the public has good reason to perceive personality and emotionality as continuous. In human psychology,
this continuity is well recognised; personality is in fact often defined as an emotional profile that persists
over time. Plutchik (1980), for example, developed the so-called ‘Emotions Profile Index’ (EPI), which
presents a theory of human personality in terms of interacting emotional styles of behaving and
responding. Although originally developed for human beings, the EPI has also been successfully applied
to the study of baboons and chimpanzees in Gombe national park, the home-base of Jane Goodall
(Buirski et al 1978). In her world-famous accounts of the chimpanzee community in Gombe, Goodall
(1990) provides in-depth profiles of individual chimpanzees, in which descriptions of their daily behaviour
patterns, emotional experiences and personality characteristics are intimately interwoven. Likewise,
Buirski and colleagues contend that the EPI descriptors they apply in their study (eg ‘shy’, ‘affectionate’)
truly reflect the animals’ emotional states, and not just ‘temperament traits’ or ‘responsiveness styles’, as
scientists often prefer to label such qualitative terms. Following on from this view, they suggest that the
EPI may be directly relevant to the study of primate welfare, providing “meaningful emotional dimensions”
for assessing the animals’ welfare state (Buirski et al 1978, p 210). More recently, the connection
between personality and subjective well-being in great apes has been investigated by King (1999) and
Weiss et al (2006). Anthropologist Barbara Smuts (2001) contemplates the many years spent living with a
troop of wild baboons in East Africa, and, addressing her perception of them as sentient, expressive
individuals, describes how “the baboons treated me as a social being, and to gain their trust I had to learn
the troop’s social conventions and behave in accordance with them. This process gave me a feeling for
what it means to be a baboon. Over time, I developed a sense of belonging to their community, and my
subjective identity seemed to merge with theirs” (Smuts 2001, p 1). Similar accounts of lives and
experiences shared with individual animals or with communities of animals are for example given by Moss
(1988; wild elephants), Shapiro (1990; companion dog), and Thomas (1995; feral dogs), and are also
discussed by Bekoff (2006a,b).

Thus there exist various scientific approaches and studies that support a qualitative perspective such as
that held by the public, in which individuality, personality and emotionality are regarded as continuous
expressions of sentient experience. However, such approaches may find acceptance for primates and
perhaps for socially sophisticated mammals such as wolves, dogs and elephants, but what about fish,
octopuses, lizards, mice, and the many other species for which personality traits have been described —
are we willing to view these traits as evidence of emotional experience? Are we willing to assume that
bold fish and octopuses feel bold, or that a nervous python feels nervous? I think it is fair to say that for
many if not most scientists this goes too far; by and large, the bridge between personality and
emotionality in animals has not been crossed. This should not come as a surprise perhaps if we realise
that if we were to cross this bridge, the implications for our relationship with animals would be enormous.
Seeing animals fundamentally as personal sentient beings would dramatically increase our emotional and
moral sensitivity to the plight of captive animals, forcing us to question more strongly than ever the moral
boundaries of our dominion (Scully 2002). However, while opening the floodgates to such concerns may
be considered problematic, a qualitative approach to the study of animal behaviour may also open doors
to novel ways of addressing these concerns.
There have been various pioneers who, in line with Buirski’s original suggestion, have begun to use
qualitative judgements of behaviour as part of their welfare-assessment protocols, to detect shifts in an
animal’s habitual style of behaving. Morton and Griffiths (1985), for example, in their seminal paper “The
recognition of pain, distress and discomfort in laboratory animals”, use terms such as ‘quiet’, ‘docile’,
‘anxious’, and ‘aggressive’ as indicators of compromised welfare. Kessler and Turner (1997, 1999)
developed a seven-level ‘cat stress score’ to assess the effect of housing in catteries on cat welfare,
using terms such as ‘relaxed’, ‘tense’, ‘fearful’, and ‘terrorised’, to indicate progressive levels of disturbed
welfare. Wiseman-Orr and colleagues (Wiseman-Orr et al 2006) report that dog owners use terms such
as ‘anxiety’, ‘fear’, ‘restlessness’, ‘sociability’, and ‘playfulness’, to identify changes in their dogs
associated with chronic pain. Our own work on the qualitative assessment of farm animal behaviour is
described in more detail below (Wemelsfelder et al 2000, 2001). No doubt there are other examples to be
found of scientists using qualitative terminologies to address an animal’s welfare state. The question is
whether these scientists are happy to regard these terminologies as direct descriptors of their animals’
experience. The people asked to actually make the assessments — the caretakers, laboratory
technicians or pet owners—mostly firmly believe this to be the case. The scientists sometimes do as well,
but tend to prefer to remain cautious in their interpretation, leaving it open whether qualitative indicators
describe behaviour, experience, or both. Science generally still feels circumspect about the status and
validity of ‘subjective assessments’; the role of the human observer and his/her integrative perceptive
powers in developing a truthful understanding of our world remains ambiguous and poorly understood
(Anderson 2007).
The scientific validation of qualitative judgements of animal behavior
Acknowledging the ‘whole animal’
The brief review presented above suggests that to address the question of animal sentience, it is
important that we consider (amongst other things) the status attributed to our ability to make integrative
judgements. Do we assume integration to take place purely in the mind of the observer, while continuing
to regard animals as aggregated systems of physical parts and motivations as represented in
conventional mechanistic animal models? Or should we accept as real what our minds tell us, and
acknowledge that animals truly are integrated beings rather than just appearing that way to us? Clearly,
the relationship between appearance and reality is a deep philosophical conundrum that cannot be
addressed adequately in this brief paper (see eg Anderson 2007). However, it is not self-evident why we
should regard ‘integration’ as a subjective property of the human mind, and ‘fragmentation’ (as practiced

by mechanistic science) as an objective property of the natural world (Dutton & Williams 2004). Our
practical, day-to-day relationships with animals would be unworkable if we did not recognize and address
them as whole, expressive individuals, and it is therefore questionable whether we can justify withholding
that wholeness from them in our theories. Even in scientific laboratories, distanced from daily life, the
success of experimental studies often depends on the ability of scientists or caretakers to develop an
empathetic and cooperative relationship with the experimental animals (Wieder 1980). Similarly,
investigations into the language skills of great apes essentially depend on the active engagement and
communication with those animals before, during and after the teaching procedures (Segerdahl et al
2005). Thus the practical necessity of relating to animals as sentient beings renders it quite meaningless,
if not duplicitous, to theoretically disallow that status. If we rely on qualitative judgements in daily life, but
then ban those judgements from science, we risk creating an artificial separation of scientifically
constructed and personally experienced realms of understanding (Midgley 1983). It seems preferable to
recognise that, as noted in the Introduction, judgements of quality are inherently vulnerable to various
forms of personal bias, and learn to deal with this constructively. It is not given that qualitative judgements
are detrimental to science; if deliberately and conscientiously applied through the use of formal
methodologies, such judgements may well open up novel ways of gaining access to both human and
animal experience (Wemelsfelder 1997; Goodwin 1999).
What then are the implications of acknowledging as real the presence of the ‘whole animal’? Primarily, to
address animals as whole beings is to perceive more than just ‘behaviour’; it is to first and foremost
perceive a ‘behaver’, an agent, who performs ‘behaviour’ in a certain manner, with a certain expression
(Wemelsfelder 1997; Wemelsfelder & Birke 1997). Animals can execute any behaviour in different ways;
they can for example walk around in a manner that is relaxed, curious and lively, or, by contrast, tense,
agitated and distressed (Fagen et al 1997). Thus, focussing on the whole animal, behaviour is seen no
longer just as physical movement, but is evaluated in a larger context, and acquires an expressive,
psychological quality (Bavidge & Ground 1994; Wemelsfelder 1997; Segerdahl et al 2005). It becomes a
‘body language’, which communicates what it is like to be that animal at a given moment in time (cf Nagel
1974). Recognition of this expressive quality is in line with, and encompasses, previous qualitative
approaches addressing the individuality, personality and emotionality of animals, as discussed above.
However, it goes further than those approaches in providing a more direct, dynamic and detailed analysis
of an animal’s experience. Body language is more than a pattern of movement or a behavioural style that
can be identified over time; it is a psychological dimension that is immediately present and available for
assessment, allowing us to judge the quality of an animal’s experience directly and in considerable detail.
As such, it identifies animals as sentient in all that they do.
Of course it is not new to discuss the expressive features of animal behaviour. There always has been
much interest in these features in the classical ethological literature, particularly in the field of animal
communication (eg Hinde 1972). Ethologists working in this field tend to assume that the effect of
‘signalling systems’ on other animals is basically automatic (ie evolved through natural selection) and not
accompanied by subjective awareness. However, that expressive features evolved through natural
selection does not preclude the possibility that the animal experiences them subjectively. The key point in
conceiving of this, as argued above, is to acknowledge the integrated, ‘whole animal’ nature of expressive
features, which endows these features with a psychological connotation and is vital for accurately
interpreting their meaning. If one were to lift expressive features out of their whole-animal context and
assess them as separate indicators of experience, they would lose their psychological connectedness
and it would become much easier to make anthropomorphic mistakes (Wemelsfelder 2001). A classic
example is to interpret pictures of open-mouth grinning in primates similarly to human laughter, as an
expression of friendly enjoyment (Foley 1935), whereas in primates this facial expression tends to signal
a mixture of fear and anger (Van Hooff 1972). However, if one was shown the animal interacting with its

surroundings, rather than an isolated image of its face, this mistake would be much less likely to occur. It
is not the grin that is the body language; it is how the animal grins, how its whole body moves, that makes
the grin an expression of fear, or anger, or something else. We must focus on the whole animal if we are
to properly judge the expressive meaning of features of behaviour, whatever feature it is.
One may wonder whether it is at all feasible to apply this approach to species which are far removed from
us on the phylogenetic scale. However, scientists and naturalists working with such animals often report
that after long years of observing their way of behaving under a wide variety of circumstances, these
animals’ expressions tend to gain transparency in increasing detail (eg Lorenz 1975). The understanding
of these animals’ body language may well remain incomplete, but that is not to say that it is indirect, or
arbitrary. It is good to realise that the danger of misinterpretation is equally of concern for more
conventional methods of measurement. Extensive experience is needed to correctly discriminate
categories of behaviour and measure these categories reliably. Is the animal feeding, exploring or trying
to escape, is it playing or attacking? This may be easy to judge in some species but not in others.
However, this does not make the use of these categories indirect; it means that their use is an acquired
skill. For both qualitative and quantitative methods of assessment, experienced, skilled judgement lies at
the heart of their effective use.
Developing and testing of formal methodology
The question thus arises whether qualitative judgements of animal body language can function reliably in
a scientific context. At the Scottish Agricultural College we have spent 10 years putting this question to
the test, with a small team of people and the help of many colleagues and students. In the context of the
present paper we can provide only the briefest of summaries of this research and its main outcomes. Our
first task was to develop a suitable methodology for investigating people’s ability to make qualitative
assessments of animal behaviour. It seemed important in this context not to work with pre-fixed lists of
descriptors, as are commonly used in animal temperament and personality studies, but to ask observers
to generate their own descriptors based on close observation of animals in various test situations. Only
such a procedure would require observers to integrate and judge the animals’ expressions for
themselves, and not be biased by provided terms. Thus we developed a two-phase experimental
procedure, based on an existing Free Choice Profiling (FCP) methodology used in food and consumer
science (Oreskovich et al 1991). This method had not previously been applied to the study of animal
behaviour, but seemed highly suited to our goals. Generally we worked with groups of 10–15 observers
(familiar with farm animals), to whom we showed video clips of animals in various settings, and then
asked them at the end of each clip to write down adjectives which they thought adequately described how
the animals had behaved. Having thus generated a list of descriptors for the observed animals’
expressions, observers would then be asked to watch the same video material again, and use their
personal terminologies to quantitatively score the intensity of perceived expressions, eg how shy or lively
they thought an animal was. Observers were asked to stick to their own personal descriptors throughout
each study, and to refrain from discussing their terms with others. To analyse the generated observer
scores, we applied a multivariate statistical technique called Generalised Procrustes Analysis (GPA). This
technique does not depend on the use of fixed variables, and enabled us to calculate the degree of
agreement between observers and to identify the commonly perceived dimensions of behavioural
expression underlying the observers’ separate assessments (for further experimental and statistical
details of this methodology, see Wemelsfelder et al 2000, 2001).
Over 10 years of research we have carried out over 60 FCP trials, involving mostly pigs, but also dairy
and beef cattle, sheep and poultry. In all of these studies, we invariably found significant agreement
between observers in the interpretation of the animals’ behavioural expressions, regardless of these
observers’ professional background. Observers could also repeat their assessments with high levels of

accuracy (Wemelsfelder et al 2001; Rousing & Wemelsfelder 2006). To test the effect of environmental
background on observer assessments we digitally projected behaving animals against both indoor and
outdoor backgrounds, and found that this did not unduly affect the observers’ characterisations of the
animals (Wemelsfelder et al unpublished data 2003). We originally started our programme of study with
individual animals (Wemelsfelder et al 2000, 2001); however, as animals on farms are mostly kept in
groups, we also tested this approach for animal groups and found that observers could reliably judge the
expressive quality of larger groups of animals (Wemelsfelder & Farish 2002). The behaviour shown in the
videos used at the FCP trials was frequently also analysed quantitatively using conventional ethograms,
and we persistently found good and meaningful correlations between qualitative and quantitative
assessments of behaviour (Wemelsfelder et al 2003; Rousing & Wemelsfelder 2006). In addition, we
recently completed a large three-year study in which qualitative assessments were demonstrated to also
correlate well with physiological measures such as heart rate and heart rate variability (Wemelsfelder et al
unpublished data 2006). The persistent coherence of observers’ qualitative assessments with quantitative
measures of behaviour and physiology is important in demonstrating that these assessments have
biological validity, and are not just unreliable ‘subjective’ perceptions. Moreover, it indicates that
qualitative judgements fulfil an important interpretative role: they complement quantitative measures by
providing empirical information on an animal’s welfare experience that is not available from the
quantitative measures themselves (Wemelsfelder & Farish 2004). In recent years, other scientists also
have successfully used FCP methodology to apply qualitative behavior assessment for the benefit of the
study of animal welfare, for example with horses (Napolitano et al 2007) and dogs (Walker et al
unpublished data 2007), and with social interactions in dairy cattle (Rousing & Wemelsfelder 2006).
Thus, there exists a substantial body of research that supports the scientific validity of assessing the
expressive body language of farm animals. This in turn opens the door to the application of this approach
as a practical animal welfare assessment tool (Wemelsfelder & Lawrence 2001). We explored this
potential in a recent collaboration with the UK State Veterinary Service (Wemelsfelder 2005). A group of
experienced veterinary inspectors was given training in qualitative behaviour assessment and
subsequently taken on a tour of commercial UK pig farms, ranging from intensive indoor to extensive
outdoor systems. At each farm, the inspectors were asked to stand for 10 min in front of several pig pens,
observing the spontaneous behaviour of all pigs in these pens. After 10 min, they were asked to score the
pigs’ body language on the basis of personal terminologies previously developed from video. We were
interested to investigate whether the inspectors would agree in their qualitative assessments of pigs in
different farming systems, and whether they found this approach a useful addition to their expertise.
Analysis of the gathered data showed that the inspectors indeed showed good agreement in their
assessments, and together identified a shift in behavioural expression occurring as the pigs’ housing
conditions became more confined and less stimulating. The relaxed, contented, playful expression typical
of pigs in outdoor and straw-based systems changed into a more irritable, anxious, bored way of
behaving in slatted- and solid-floor systems with small, barren pens. One inspector commented that prior
to our study he would have judged pigs to be either healthy or unhealthy, but that he had now become
aware that pigs, although healthy, could nevertheless lead frustrated and unhappy lives in some housing
systems. Because he had not been forced to accept this, but had made this observation using his own
descriptors, he felt confident to discuss it with farmers to try to improve the situation. Thus this study
indicated that highly experienced veterinary inspectors, given the freedom to generate their own
descriptors, felt comfortable using terms such as ‘contented’, ‘joyful’, ‘frustrated’ or ‘aimless’, and were
able to use these terms as scoring tools for identifying the effect of housing conditions on the welfare of
pigs (Wemelsfelder 2005).

Discussion and animal welfare implications
The research work reviewed above suggests that when we take the time to closely observe animals and
the quality of their expressions, we can develop greater insight into their welfare and QoL. Are the
animals contented, sociable, playful, or do they appear irritable, unsettled, uncomfortable, or withdrawn
into themselves? These seem important questions, not just for farm animals, but for all animals under our
care. The development of approaches allowing us to consider such questions should contribute
significantly to improving the welfare of these animals.
Animal caretakers should be well-placed to use qualitative terminologies to address their animals’ QoL,
and indeed many professionals do. In some cases, formal use of such judgements is encouraged, but in
other cases caretakers avoid explicitly discussing them for fear of appearing unscientific. However, in
dealing with such tensions it is crucial to realise that good judgement is a skill that requires practice,
experience and training. If one is not sufficiently familiar with a particular species, or with a particular
individual, it is possible to misinterpret or overlook particular expressions. Knowledge of species-specific
behavioural repertoires, and extensive experience in observing and interacting with individuals in different
contexts, is required to accurately judge the meaning of animal body language. In developing this skill it is
particularly important to adopt a ‘whole animal’ perspective, and always judge observed details of posture
and behaviour in light of the entire animal’s interaction with its surroundings. Such a perspective requires
engagement with the animal’s situation, and is essentially built on relationship and empathetic
communication. The skill to communicate effectively with the animals in one’s company is ancient and
does not need scientific validation to prove its worth. However, if this approach is to be used in a scientific
context, or as a formal practical assessment tool, it does need validation and support of a reliable
methodology. The growing interest in qualitative approaches to the study of animals, as reviewed in this
paper, should support these goals.
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